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British Muslim communities comprise 
a diverse range of traditions, in which 
four major tendencies are identifiable: 
the largest numbers of followers come 
from the Barelwi tradition, followed by 
Deobandi, then Jamaat-i Islam inspired 
institutions, and finally the Ahl-i-Hadith 
network. All of these are theological and 
ideological trends imported into the UK 
with the arrival of the early South Asian 
settler communities in the 1960s and 
1970s. The remainder of British Muslims 
tend to be organized around ethnicity. Only a handful of mosques openly 
identify themselves as Salafi; key among them are institutions like the 
Green Lane Mosque in Birmingham, Salafi Institute, Birmingham, Masjid 
Ibn Taymiyyah in Brixton, and the Islamic Centre of Luton. Pinpointing the 
precise entry of Salafi ideas into the UK is speculative at best, but it is 
thought to have occurred towards the late 1980s.1 
The Emergence of British Salafism
The instrumental organization for the spread of Salafism in the UK was 
the Jamiyyat Ihya Minhaj as Sunnah, “The Society for the Revival of the 
Prophetic Way” (JIMAS).2 Its leader Manwar Ali, also known as “Abu Mun-
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tasir,” is credited by many as being the 
father of “Salafi dawah”(proselytizing) in 
the UK. He is largely responsible for the 
spread of Salafism among young people 
through his delivery of countless “study 
circles” at mosques, community centres, 
and universities across the country. Fur-
thermore, replicating global patterns, 
the spread of Salafi interpretations of 
Islam in the UK was underwritten by 
the financial investment into religious 
institutions and distribution of litera-
ture from Saudi Arabia and the return of religious studies graduates from 
Saudi Arabia’s two main universities.
Methodologically, Salafism relies upon scriptural literalism and re-
volves around a set of binary opposites: tawhid (oneness of God) and 
opposition shirk (all forms of divine association-ism), loyalty to the 
sunnah (prophetic example) in matters of belief and religious ritual 
as opposed to bid‘a (innovation), an emblematic respect for the pious 
first three generations of Muslims, and general loss of confidence 
and interest in subsequent phases of Muslim intellectual history, and 
rejection of taqlid (adherence/loyalty to one school of Islamic law) in 
favour of literalist approaches to Islamic jurisprudence.
The early 1990s was the defining era for second-generation 
Islamic activism; indeed this decade was perhaps the most in-
tense for its identity politics. Adherents to Salafi perspectives 
were drawn mainly from second generation male and female 
South Asian Muslims with a significant number of black and 
white converts. The average age of followers was between 
eighteen and thirty years; they were geographically located 
most often near the mosque communities already mentioned. 
Membership to religious organizations provided opportuni-
ties for the creation of communities of shared meaning and 
strong friendship networks important to younger people 
wanting to feel part of something bigger than themselves.
Muslims tired of what they saw as “cultural Islam” found in 
the Salafi perspective an approach to religious commitment 
which seemed to be intellectually rigorous, evidence-based, 
and stripped of the perceived corruptions of the folkloric reli-
gion of the Barelwis, or the “wishy washy” alternatives offered 
by rival Islamic tendencies such as Young Muslims UK or Hizb 
ut-Tahrir. Adopting a Salafi identity was in effect a process of 
exchanging and re-routing religious language and symbols. 
For subscribers to Salafism, the messages of other groups 
were not seen as convincing due to their lack of scholarly 
reference points and perception of compromise with kafir 
(heathen) culture. British Salafis could also frequently cite the 
senior scholars of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz (d. 1999), Ibn al-Uthay-
min (d. 2001), and the hadith specialist al-Albani (d. 1999), to 
buttress arguments from authority and silence those with an 
inferior command of scholastic frames of reference. 
Towards the middle 1990s, Salafism as an alternate reli-
gious paradigm became well established through mosques, 
networks, publications, media, and a large body of literature 
available on the Internet. Joining the Salafi dawah meant ac-
quiring membership into a multi-ethnic, supranational identi-
ty which offered a revival of “pure” Islamic practices that were 
seen as lacking in other Islamic trends. These communities of 
meaning provided an intellectual as well as physical refuge 
from readings and practices of Islam that were judged to be 
inauthentic, inferior, or deviant. In comparison to other Mus-
lim groups, the Salafi trend seemed to offer a cohesive iden-
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The popularity of Salafism in the UK is 
attributable to the convergence of the 
globalization of Salafi discourse, the search for 
religious identity among second generation 
British Muslims seeking “pure” religion, and 
the competition for recruits between rival 
Islamic currents. British Salafism has become 
diversified to such an extent that it is no longer 
recognizable as a single movement, with the 
development taking unexpected turns that 
belie popular monolithic representations.
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tity option that young people could purchase which might explain 
its relatively greater attraction for converts seeking “a ‘rationalized 
Islam’, one already stripped of the niceties and ambiguities of juristic 
reasoning, the complexities of theology, and the subtleties of Suf-
ism.”3
Rise of the “Super Salafis”
The development of British Salafism reached a critical juncture in 
1995 when tensions that had been simmering for a year or so between 
factions inside JIMAS eventually caused the organization to rupture 
and leave an ideological split that remains to this day. Ever since the 
first Gulf War in 1991, Salafi scholars have been divided over the pres-
ence of US troops in the heart of the Muslim world. The origins of this 
division started within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia when a faction 
of younger scholars began questioning why its rulers had invited the 
Americans to fight another Muslim country, and worse still, establish 
military bases. Ideologically they were led by Salman al-Audah and 
Safar al-Hawali who gained prominence for their rebellious stances 
against the government.
Quintan Wiktorowicz provides a helpful typology in differentiat-
ing three main global trends that were identifiable as a result of this 
emerging intra-Salafi factionalism; purists, politicos, and Jihadis.4 The 
“purists” remain loyal to the principles of Salafi ‘aqida (creed), and the 
Saudi state and therefore resisted any attempt to challenge the author-
ity of the rulers. Their priority was peaceful preaching—reform and cor-
rection of Muslim belief and ritual practice. The “politicos” agreeing to 
the importance of the Salafi creed nevertheless argued that the reform 
manhaj (methodology) had to include a consideration of the complex 
and changing social-political realities taking place in the world, which 
need to be addressed in addition to the concerns of the Salafi dawah. 
The Jihadis, on the other hand were impatient of the status quo, had 
participated in theatres of conflict like Afghanistan and wanted to take 
direct action, using violence to affect social change. All three tenden-
cies share the Salafi positions in matters of theology but differ in their 
analysis of problems in the Muslims world and on how they should be 
solved.
These shifting currents had direct consequences on the UK Salafi 
scene as JIMAS and individuals associated with them made direct 
links with Salafi figures in Saudi Arabia. The split similarly started ap-
pearing in Britain with the pro-Saudi government position member, 
Abdul Wahid, also known as Abu Khadeejah, leading the polarization 
of positions within the group. He challenged Abu Muntasir and those 
who were sympathetic to the anti-Saudi government stance, causing a 
process of fragmentation over a period of one year. Despite attempts 
by senior figures within the UK Salafi community, the rift became ir-
reconcilable with the Abu Khadeejah faction eventually breaking away 
and taking a significant number of people with them to form OASIS 
(Organization of Ahl al Sunnah Islamic Societies), the precursor to Salafi 
Publications, and associated websites.5 
This faction then established the Salafi Institute and became known 
for their intolerant and polemical attitude to former colleagues and 
other Muslim groups. A form of theological Inquisition was initiated 
where people were condemned for not being Salafi enough. The de-
tails of these differences between various protagonists are a labyrinth 
of theological argument, counter claims, accusations and rebuttals, a 
flavour of which can be sampled by visiting their main websites. This 
mindset eventually led Abu Khadeejah and his followers to be deroga-
torily labelled by moderates as the “Super Salafis,” because of their 
ruthless witch-hunt tactics of non-conformist Salafis who refused to 
capitulate to their version of correct Salafi belief and methodology. 
People were accused of being “Hizbiyyah,” “Qutbiyyah,” “Sorouri,” pejo-
rative terms referring to ideas and figures deemed beyond the pale, 
which resulted in a form of religious McCarthyism. The term Hizbiyyah 
would imply that someone was influenced by movements like the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, while Qutbiyyah refers to the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
ideologue Sayyid Qutb; Sorour was a prominent Salafi figure based in 
the UK for two decades until the late 1990s. Black lists, boycotts, and 
character assassinations continue to divide British Salafis to this day. 
This dark period had other impacts on the relationships between peo-
ples and their families, with some people becoming socially estranged, 
couples divorcing, and individuals suffering what became known as 
the “Salafi Burnout,” when individuals suffered a dramatic loss of faith 
and religious practice. 
The counter attack of “traditional Islam”
Another major factor in the evolution of Salafism in the UK has been 
the increasing appeal of “traditional Islam,” an activist and scholarly 
form of Sufism, which was initially popularized by charismatic Ameri-
can convert scholar Hamza Yusuf.6 He seemed 
to mesmerize audiences with the depth of his 
knowledge of Islam and apparent polymathic 
command of subjects as diverse as music, litera-
ture, and science. Prominent moderate Salafis at 
the time, though privately in awe of his learning, 
publicly dismissed him as Sufi. The traditional 
Islam trend in effect appropriated some of the au-
thority from the Salafi scholars, resulting in a re-
duction of some of the aura of knowledgeability 
from British Salafis and offering a broader, richer 
understanding of Islam that emphasized the spir-
itual dimensions of religion. The impact of Hamza 
Yusuf’s message was reinforced and echoed by 
two other prominent convert scholars, the Eng-
lish Abdal Hakim Murad (b. 1960), a Cambridge 
professor of Islamic Studies, and the American 
Shaykh Nuh Keller (b.1954) who is based in Jor-
dan. The three figures spearheaded a strategy 
of discrediting the politicized readings of Islam 
found in the literature of the reformist Islamists 
and deconstructing the claims to textual ortho-
doxy of the Salafi groupings. Especially Abdal Hakim Murad has been 
prolific in this regard; his writings consititute one of the most popular 
resources for “traditional Islam.”7
The influence of Salafi trends on British Muslim communities has been 
larger than its numerical presence among communities; their influence 
is disproportional as a result of the effectiveness of their literature dis-
tribution and web presence. Today, people that subscribe to Salafi per-
spectives can broadly be described as either those that gravitate to the 
outlook of the “Super Salafis,” or feel more comfortable with the JIMAS 
approach; those whose religious praxis is what could be described as a 
“methodological Salafism”—a literalist reading of scripture but which 
is not aligned with any particular group or institution; or those who 
might be described as “post-Salafi.” Leading British Salafis such as Abu 
Aliyah, Abu Muntasir, and Usama Hasan are not obsessed with defining 
themselves as Salafi. More complex hybridized identities are emerging 
where, for example, Usama Hasan goes as far as to refer to himself as a 
Wahhabbi–Sufi! In an interview with the author, he argued that some 
of the categories used by analysts miss the complex, evolving nature of 
contemporary British Salafi trends. Leading Salafi 
activists are now trying to bridge the sectarian di-
vides once thought impossible. In the aftermath 
of the Iraq invasion and resulting intra-Muslim 
violence, there have been high profile attempts 
to reconcile opposing theological trends, through 
initiatives such as the Amman Message8 and the 
Sunni Pledge,9 a pledge of mutual respect and 
cooperation between Sunni Muslim scholars and 
organizations. These developments challenge the 
nuance-lacking representations of Salafism in re-
cent times as well as indicate the dynamic and or-
ganic nature of religious identity formation.
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